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Recent Decisions
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-HETEROLOGOUS ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION-
Husband consenting to the insemination of his wife is criminally liable
for support of child; for purposes of Penal Code, defendant is lawful
father of child so conceived.
The People v. Sorensen, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968).
Defendant, after several years of marriage, was medically deter-
mined to be sterile. At first defendant refused his wife's request for
a child, either by adoption or artificial insemination.' Eventually,
agreement to the latter alternative was reached. Both parties signed an
agreement, in the form of a request, that the physician inseminate the
wife with the sperm of a white male. Mrs. Sorensen was treated and
became pregnant. The child was born and the birth certificate named
the defendant as the father.2 A normal family relationship existed for
about four years, the defendant representing to be the boy's father.3
The wife later secured a separation, taking custody of the child, and
advised the defendant that no support would be required. A divorce
was granted to Mr. Sorensen, his wife consenting to the action. The
court did, however, retain jurisdiction on the issue of possible support.
Mrs. Sorensen subsequently became ill and applied for public assis-
tance. No support was forthcoming from defendant, although demand
for such was made by the District Attorney. The defendant was con-
I. The forms of artificial insemination (hereinafter Al) prevalent today are as follows:
Homologous Artificial Insemination, whereby the wife is inseminated with the husband's
semen. Few legally relevant consequences flow from employment of this method. Heterol-
ogous Artificial Insemination (hereinafter AID) is the method whereby the woman is
inseminated with the semen of a third party donor; this practice raises a host of legal
questions of which the instant case is evidence of but one. A third technique, known as
Combination Artificial Insemination (hereinafter CAI), is achieved by mixing the hus-
band's sperm, which is separately incapable of impregnating his wife, with the sperm of
a third party donor.
The medical aspects of Al will not presently be discussed, for an excellent treatment of
the subject see Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion-An
Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 HOUSTON L. REV. 277 (1966).
2. In any case where the impregnation of the wife results from AID and the wife's
husband is named on the birth certificate as the father of the child, a question arises as
to whether a violation of a statute prohibiting the intentional falsification of public
records and documents has occurred, since the true father is a third party donor, usually
of anonymous identity. Although the court does not address itself to this issue, the pos-
sible problems which may arise are quite obvious. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6201 (West
1966). See also, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (1963).
3. The attitude of the defendant appears to be quite typical. One of the attractive
features of Al is the element of secrecy which adoption does not afford. The secrecy,
however, presents innumerable problems. The legal, moral, and social implications are
not surfaced, and therefore, any discussion of Al will necessarily be bottomed in specula-
tion, conjecture and reliance on a few individuals who may qualify as being informed.
It has been estimated that ten percent of all marriages today are barren, and of these,
ten to forty percent are wholly or chiefly due to infertility of the male partner. According
to a 1960 estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 births were taking place per year as a result of Al.
This amount would appear to be increasing. Verkauf, supra note 1.
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victed by the municipal court for a violation of the Penal Code which
requires a father to support a legitimate or illegitimate minor child.
4
From this determination an appeal was taken.
The court recognized that certain statutory presumptions of legiti-
macy5 existed, and it was flatly stated that the case could be disposed of
on the ground that these presumptions were not overcome.6 However,
in view of the stipulated facts, and not willing to dispense with the case
on such grounds, the court addressed the issue squarely: "Is the hus-
band of a woman, who with his consent was artificially inseminated
with semen of a third party donor, guilty of the crime of failure to sup-
port a child who is the product of such insemination, in violation of sec-
tion 270 of the Penal Code?"' 7 (Emphasis in original). The question was
resolved affirmatively. It was held that the defendant was the lawful
father of the child with an obligation of support. The case turned on
"whether the legal relationship of father and child exists." Buttressing
the rationale was a finding of legislative intent to enforce the obliga-
tion of support against one determined to be the lawful father. The
statute was construed to impose this duty of support on one who
actively participates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination
and has knowledge of the legal responsibilities which follow. The court
then emphasized that "[o]ne who consents to the production of a child
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1955). The relevant part of the statute reads:
"A father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child who willfully omits without
lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance or other
remedial care for his child is guilty of a misdemeanor.
5. CAL. Evm. CODE § 661 (West 1966).
A child of a woman who is or has been married, born during the marriage or within
300 days after the dissolution thereof, is presumed to be a legitimate child of that
marriage. This presumption may be disputed only by the people of the State of
California in a criminal action brought under Section 270 of the Penal Code or
by the husband or wife, or the descendant of one or both of them. In a civil action,
this presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.
CAL. CIVIL PRO. CODE § 1963 (West 1954) enumerates several other presumptions, which, if
uncontradicted, will prevail. Among them is Subsection 31, reading: "[A presumption
arises] [t]hat a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce from bed and board,
is legitimate."
6. The concept of presuming legitimacy has its historic roots in Goodright ex dem.
Stevens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777), in an opinion by Lord Mansfield.
The extent to which this presumption has been adopted by the contemporary judicial
world is evidenced in In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 8, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (1930), where Chief
Judge Cardozo stated: "If a husband and wife are living together in the conjugal relation,
legitimacy will be presumed, though the wife has harbored an adulterer. . . . It may
even be presumed though the spouses are living apart if there is a fair basis for the belief
that at times they may have come together." See also, IX J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE 448 § 2527 (3d ed., 1940).
7. 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 9-10, 437 P.2d 495, 497-498 (1968).
8. Id. at 10, 437 P.2d at 498.
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cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at
will . .. "
Paternity, an essential element of a violation of Section 270,10 was
established via documentary evidence; specifically, the written agree-
ment requesting insemination, the birth certificate naming defendant
as father, and the copy of the interlocutory decree of divorce. In light
of this evidence, the word "father" was construed to include, not only
the traditional definition, but also, one who purchases semen with the
objective of inseminating his wife. A further element, willfulness, was
found to be present since no evidence was introduced to explain the
omission of support. Mrs. Sorensen's statements that she wanted no
support from the defendant were of no moment since she had neither
the power nor authority to alter the child's legal right to be supported.1
The court's rationale for imposing liability upon the defendant was
aided by a finding that the objective of Section 270 d12 is to secure
support for the child and alleviate the necessity of public assistance. It
would seem to be a fair interpretation to view these last remarks as
indicating that had the statute involved contemplated punishment
instead of being support oriented, the result would have been contra.
The quagmire presented by the legitimacy issue is avoided by reason-
ing that "[i]t is less crucial to determine the status of the child than the
status of the defendant as the father. Categorizing the child as either
legitimate or illegitimate does not resolve the issue of the legal conse-
quences flowing from defendant's participation in the child's exis-
tence."'13 The court recognized that public policy favors legitimation,
and that "no valid public purpose is served by stigmatizing an artificially
conceived child as illegitimate."' 4
9. Id. at 11, 437 P.2d at 499.
10. Patterson v. Municipal Court, 232 Cal. App. 2d 289, 42 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1965),
interpreted § 270e of the Penal Code as establishing prima facie finding of paternity where
the evidence exists sufficient to determine paternity in a civil action. However, one can
only be convicted under this section if the jury finds, "beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is the father .. " The fact that defendant had no knowledge of the
contents of the birth certificate was not sufficient to purge liability.
11. For this proposition the court cited Dixon v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 440, 14 P.2d 497 (1932),
and People v. Swiggy, 69 Cal. App. 574, 232 P. 174, 178 (1925). (Opinion of supreme
court denying hearing.)
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270d (West 1955).
In any case where there is a conviction and sentence under the provisions of either
§ 270 or 270a, [Failure to provide for wife; punishment] of this code, should a fine
be imposed such fine may be directed by the court to be paid in whole or in part
to the wife of the defendant or guardian or custodian of the child or children of
such defendant.




The court again took the initiative by interpreting the absence of
legislation on the subject of artificial insemination as permitting a free
judicial hand, as contrasted with the New York view 15 holding that
absence of legislative action demonstrated a legislative disinclination
to recognize an AID child as legitimate. 16 Although the New York view
can be supported by logic, since the legislation was only proposed and
never adopted, this alone cannot be considered conclusive. The view
that "a legislature can legislate by not legislating" has been persuasively
attacked. 17 It should be obvious that extreme caution must be exercised
by the courts where inferences are going to be drawn from legislative
silence as being indicative of a particular legislative posture. Where the
legislature deems necessary, a positive utterance clarifying the issue is
always possible. The divergent social views and the possible political
repercussions attendant to legislation in the area of artificial insemina-
tion may be sufficient warrant for the bench to disregard legislative
inaction as a negative imperative.
Despite the lengthy analysis and the seemingly broad foundation
of the rationale, the holding is specifically restricted to Section 270 of
the Penal Code and the facts presented. It is recognized in the opinion
that legitimation and succession of property are legislative domains.
Quite possibly the court, after expressing its rather avant-garde views, is
willing to await the legislative imprimatur before extending the ra-
tionale beyond the confines of the fact situation presented. The singular
importance of any given AI case becomes evident when one notes the
paucity of primary authority on the subject. Thus, an unfortunate
aspect of the case surfaces, namely, aspersions are cast on reasoning
leading to an expanded result, or when applied to variant facts.
The availability of divergent views may be illustrated by a cursory
chronological examination of other AI cases. Dicta from an early case
is no doubt at least partially responsible for the judicial hostility of some
courts to view Al as a socially acceptable phenomenon. In Orford v.
Orfordi8 the court, accepting the husband's defense of adultery to the
wife's action for alimony, went on to offer its view of the argument
presented by the wife that the child, allegedly the product of the
15. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
16. The only law in New York concerning Al is the NEW YORK CITY SANITARY CODE
§ 112, which provides for examination of sperm donors. A summary of this position is
aptly characterized in 47 MARQ. L. REV. 585, 591 (1964): "This code section has put New
York City in the ridiculous position of legislating the production of illegitimate children."
17. Hart, Comment on the Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
ToMoRRow 46-48 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
18. 49 ONT. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
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adultery, had been conceived through artificial insemination. It was
commented that:
the essence of the offense of adultery consists, not in moral turpi-
tude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender
to another person of the reproductive powers or facilities of the
guilty person; and any submission of these powers to the service
or enjoyment of any person other than the husband or wife comes
within the definition of "adultery." 19
More dictum, running contrary to the Orford case can be found in
Hoch v. Hoch,20 where, although the divorce sued for was granted
upon the grounds of traditional adultery, it was stated that had AID
been employed it would not have supported a charge of adultery.
In Strnad v. Strnad2' the right of visitation was granted to a defendant
who had consented to the insemination of his wife. The court reasoned
that the child was "potentially adopted or semi-adopted. 22 Analogizing
the situation presented to that where a child is born out of wedlock and
is legitimized by the law upon the marriage .of the interested parties,
the court concluded that the child was not illegitimate.
L. v. L. 23 presented another variant problem. A child was born to
the couple as a result of the wife being artificially inseminated with
the seed of the husband. Consummation of the marriage had not taken
place. The wife's petition for a decree of nullity was granted, thereby
bastardizing the child.
Testimony by a wife that the child was the product of AID was not
permitted in Ohlson v. Ohlson.24 Thus, utilization of the evidentiary
rule presuming legitimacy allowed the court to avoid a direct confronta-
tion with the AI issue.
A caustic approach to the problem of AID can be found in Doornbos
v. Doornbos.25 There, it was stated that AID was contrary to public
policy and good morals, and constituted adultery on the part of the
mother. It followed that the child was found to be illegitimate.
In Maclennan v. Maclennan26 the husband brought an action for
19. Id. at 22-23, 58 D.L.R. at 258.
20. Unreported (No. 44-C-9307, Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct. 1948).
21. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
22. Id.
23. [1949] P. 211, [1949] 1 AII.E.R. 141. This view has been adequately rejected. See
Lang, Does Artificial Insemination Constitute Adultery?, 2 MANrrOBA L.J. 87 (1966); Note,
Artificial Insemination, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 302 (1964).
24. Unreported (No. 53-S-1410, Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1954).
25. Unreported (No. 54-S-14981, Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1954).
26. [1958] Sess. Cas. 105 (Scot. Outer House), [1958] Scotts L. T. 12.
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divorce, pointing to a child born to the wife as the proof of adultery.
The wife defended on the ground that the child was the product of AID
without the husband's consent. The Scottish court held that AID did
not constitute adultery on the part of the wife.
Gursky v. Gursky27 demonstrated how an approach that is contrary to
the instant case can lead to the same result. Taking a traditional view
of legitimacy, the Gursky court reasoned: "The concept which his-
torically is deeply imbedded in the law is that a child who is begotten
through a father who is not the mother's husband is deemed to be
illegitimate." 28 Obviously, it is desirable that children be supported.
The court dealt with the pressing need to satisfy this value by employ-
ing certain legal fictions. It was concluded that liability for support
could be predicated upon either an implied contract to support or
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The offering of al-
ternative fictions only tends to point out the weakness of the rationale.
Finally, on the strength of Gursky, the court in Anonymous v.
Anonymous2 9 held a husband liable for support of two daughters con-
ceived by AID, the father consenting to the insemination. It was not
specifically decided whether the children were deemed to be illegiti-
mate; but the strong reliance placed upon Gursky would indicate that
such a finding would be the probable result if the issue were pursued.
It should be evident that judicial thinking has yet to establish sound
legal principles in the area of AID. Unfortunately, divergent views can
also be found among the writers in the field. There is some reluctance
to address the problem of AID squarely, and this is most obvious where
the evidentiary nature of the problem is stressed. Reliance on the
necessity of clear and convincing proof to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy, and the weight to be accorded laboratory findings of steril-
ity, are the hallmarks of this approach. 30 It is submitted that this at-
tempted solution will only forestall the inevitable; someday a fact
situation will be presented where the court will be faced with a hus-
band who is able to establish non-access to his wife for a period greater
than that required for gestation. At this point the court will have to
embrace the fiction that proof of non-access is not permissible, or be
faced anew with the problem presently at hand.
27. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
28. Id. at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
29 41 Misc. 2d 866, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30. Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAMILY L.
39 (1965).
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The foregoing view does have as its objective the legitimation of
children conceived through AID. This is not a universally sought goal.
The opposition to AID stresses the likelihood of incest occurring where
the semen of one donor is used to inseminate several women, or the "in-
herently extra-marital nature of AID." 3'1
The only consistency in the area appears to be the cry for legislation.
A case by case development of this field could easily lead to unprece-
dented confusion. The types of insemination available32 and the multi-
tude of problems which could arise make judicial evolution inappro-
priate. In the face of this jural quandary the legislatures remain in-
active. 33
Due to the novelty of the field of inquiry a fundamental question is
posed to the court which is as jurisprudential in nature as it is prag-
matic: viz., to what extent, if at all, should the judicial machinery be
utilized in dealing with such problems. It is axiomatic that a most
fundamental value in Anglo-American law is that of precedent, for this
insulates the individual from an arbitrary application of the law.
However, too strict of an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis will
thwart the growth of the law. It is, then, the function of the judge to
balance "[t]he social interest served by symmetry or certainty ... against
the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of
social welfare."34
From the tenor of the few past decisions, there is little doubt that
children conceived via AID will be supported by the mother's husband,
at least where consent to the insemination is given. Unfortunately,
there is considerable doubt as to the status of a child so conceived. The
consistency of the courts in finding a duty to support an AID child, and
the inconsistency in determining the child's status can be explained by
viewing the affect any particular holding will have on society. Children,
regardless of their status, must be supported, and the courts are loath
to cast this burden upon society. Legitimacy, on the other hand, di-
rectly affects only an individual, and is primarily a personal matter. The
31. Rice, A.I.D.-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 510 (1959).
32. See discussion note 1, supra.
33. The only legislation in the area appears to be the NEW YORK CITY SANITARY CODE
§ 112, referred to at note 15, supra; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551-553 (Supp. 1968); and GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 74-101.1, 74-9904 (Supp. 1967).
Several writers have offered some direction to the legislatures in framing adequate legis-
lation. Vecchi, Artificial Insemination and Legitimacy in Pennsylvania, 66 DICK. L. REv.
1 (1961); Comment, Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child?, 9 VILL. L. REv.
77 (1963); Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 859 (1965).
34. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
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conclusion being that the courts are more sensitive to the greater
pressure exerted by the public, than to the miniscule pressure exerted
by the individual. Under these circumstances, the prospects of achieving
uniformity as to the status of AID children are dim.
The instant decision arrives at a fair and just holding which is fully
supported by the rationale. Although the decision may be characterized
by some as result orientated, the alternative would require that a
contemporary problem be addressed utilizing judicial concepts and
precedents apposite to the problems of another age. Artificial insemina-
tion was most certainly not a consideration by the court that first
bastardized a child to protect the line of inheritance of a feudal lord,
nor did the common law concept of adultery contemplate a third party
donor.
Artificial insemination is the product of a modern age. There are few
objective criteria to guide the courts when they enter into this realm.
Until the legislature or overriding policy considerations indicate a
course to be pursued, it is suggested that the courts focus their inquiry
on the individual rights involved, as did the court in the instant litiga-
tion.
Edward C. Land, Jr.
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